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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 





Member of the Scientific and Organizing Committee 












The early stages of banking and finance in Turkey were one of its brightest periods, 
even though it was the toughest because of lack of capital and unfavourable initial 
conditions. The finance and banking conception was quite rational and potential crises 
were eliminated through careful choices. In the following years, boom and bust 
conditions dominated financial services provision with a crisis in every decade under 
different economic policy frameworks. Since 2001, European convergence has been 
leading the way and one may argue that Turkish banking and finance is ready for the 
challenges of the 21
st century, supported by fast-increasing foreign participation that 
has increased capital adequacy ratios. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the history and evolution of banking in 
Turkey. It may not be a strong assumption that banking is an activity purely based on 
trust and reliance on the goodwill of deposit custodians or credit repayment. It requires 
proper regulation and supervision under the social rule of law with proper societal and 
habitual records. Scottish banking is historically well perceived in these accounts. The 
Ottoman Empire never had such a track record in banking and finance. We may argue 
that one reason for the extremely underdeveloped banking services in the Ottoman 
Empire was the strong reaction to an important part of personal wealth creation: 
interest. It was religiously unacceptable to take interest payments for borrowing 
activities among the Muslim citizens of the Empire and financial services relied 
heavily on non-Muslims, mostly Christians and Jews. As nationalism became a 
destroying trend for the Ottoman Empire and many different groups of the Empire 
preferred to declare independence, Turkish banking and financial development began 
to take its first steps as secularism was one of the main components of the new 
Republic: interest was therefore allowed to be a part of personal wealth creation. It 
was in Asia Minor that money had been invented; however, the same track record is 
not evident in the case of banking and finance for one reason or another. 
This paper first provides an historical analysis of the emergence of banking and 
finance by addressing religious temples as the safest banks during early history 
(Section 2) while Section 3 is devoted to a summary of banking in the Ottoman 
Empire. Section 4 analyses the emergence of banking and finance in the new Turkish 
Republic in depth, including the reasons why public money was invested in the early 
years and why banking was without a national central bank in the first decade. The 
impact of both 1929 US financial crisis and the Second World War is also covered. 
Moreover, the emergence of private banking is investigated. A plan-based 
development strategy and its impact on banking and finance is covered with special 
emphasis given to why Turkish banking and finance paid a high price for misjudging 
the paradigm shift during the first and second oil crises in the 1970s. In particular, it 
provides an analysis of how banking and finance progressed after the export-led 
growth strategy had been introduced during 1980s and how the banking crises   8
absorbed an important amount of already scarce capital. The “lost years” of the 1990s 
are also examined by addressing the banking crisis of 1994 and the financial crisis of 
2001. Finally, Section 5 explores the re-structuring and re-capitalisation of banks after 
the destructive financial crises at the beginning of the 21
st century. The paper 
concludes with an assessment of the future prospects for banking and finance in 
Turkey under the assumption that European convergence will continue. 
 
2. Banking and Finance in general 
It may not be surprising to assume that only temples would have served as 
wealth custodians in the pre-historic periods as they represented trust and reliance. In 
the 18
th century BC, first examples of lending activity were observed in Babylon, 
where loans were recorded officially and Hammurabi’s Code provided the first legal 
base for primitive banking activity. 
During 700 BC, the Lydians became the first in the Western world to make 
coins. Asia Minor led early developments in banking with this invention. In 1100 AD, 
as Christianity expanded in Europe, banking innovations in Genoa and around the 
Mediterranean region where intensified international trade was observed, as well as 
Papal Banking were building up. In 1800 AD, Venice took over with a better security 
structure with its unique geographical location. In that century, the gold standard was 
invented and representative money appeared in countries such as Sweden and 
England, where central banks were established in parallel to national banks, both 
public and private. Central banks emerged not only as a consequence of the endless 
financial deficits of war-making kings and sultans, but also from a need to establish a 
clearing house that would support the banking system during the times of heightened 
stress in order to prevent bank runs. Scottish banking during the Free Banking era 
(White, 1995) successfully managed to decrease the inevitability of central banks 
when there is an inclusive clearing bank for all banks, which had been owned by all 
banks to support systemic trust. However, in many other countries, central banks were 
assigned with the responsibility of being a lender of last resort in order to eliminate 
systemic risk.   9
It has been from 1900 to the present that financial deepening and innovation 
have been increasing their dominance in the world of banking and finance. As central 
banks were nationalised almost in all parts of the world and the gold standard relaxed 
from time to time under well-capitalised private financial structures, lending and 
borrowing activity increased continually. After the collapse of mono-bank systems in 
the 1980s, the system of collecting deposits from the savers and distributing them to 
investors has become a “small” part of the whole extremely complex nature of huge 
financial conglomerates, with the help of ever increasing globalisation. 
It may be argued that the evolution of banking and finance will not end in the 
near future. Because of continuously increasing computing power and decreasing 
communication costs, more paradigm shifts can be expected in terms of globalisation 
of the payment systems including electronic money through emerging currency areas 
other than the Eurozone, heightened mergers and acquisitions among banks and 
financial service providers to increase competitiveness, increased recoupling and 
decoupling of activities and ever more “organised interventions” by cooperating 
central banks. At the end, it may only be one world, one money and a banking and 
financial system for all. Under these circumstances, the road for Turkish banking and 
finance would be to adapt itself to ever increasing challenges of the global banking 
and finance by all means, including membership of the European Union. 
 
3. Banking and Finance in the Ottoman Empire 
The Ottoman Empire has generally been blamed as having missed the 
opportunities of industrial revolution. It may be true to argue that, although the 
Ottoman Empire was among the major empires playing a global role in those times, it 
failed to create a strong capital base in order to stimulate sustainable development and 
increase welfare within its borders. The reasons are many and varied, ranging from the 
continuous loss of land as a result of strong pressure from the nationalist movements 
within the Empire, to tired and unmotivated citizens because of the corruption and 
mismanagement within the Istanbul Palaces. However, one should also pay a special 
emphasis on the misjudgement of the importance of banking and finance in producing 
sustainable welfare gains in the long run. Kazgan (1997) gives a perfect example of  10
the unlawful financial practices in the Empire of taking over the wealth from the rich 
whenever there was a deficit in public accounts, sometimes by taking lives of the rich 
with ‘made-up’ accusations. 
One of the signs of this mistake is the fact that commercial banking development 
within the Empire was limited to a couple of bankers settled in a particular district in 
Istanbul called Galata
1. Even though street banking triggered the start of banking and 
finance, the strict rules of Sultans Treasury management prevented private banking 
from emerging. As the Empire missed the industrial revolution, there was no chance 
for private wealth accumulation and the Sultans’ wealth was kept mostly in gold, 
hidden in the Castles, to be used for war finance and the construction of more and 
more beautiful palaces, instead of for productivity-enhancing investment. 
It may be argued that Ottoman Sultans were too late to understand the dynamics 
of banking and finance. Missing the industrial revolution, the economy was losing its 
already limited comparative advantages to challenge competing kingdoms all around. 
Moreover, endless wars imposed a huge financial cost and leading bankers were 
licensed simply to decrease the cost of borrowing from other countries. There was an 
incentive for local wealth holders to lend to the Sultans and this that brought the 
Galata bankers as the early experiments in banking and finance. 
Banking licences had been distributed in order to ease the burden of borrowing 
more from European capitals. Ongoing wars in many parts of the Empire put huge 
pressure on public finance and created a destructive borrowing requirement. Bank 
licences were mostly given to foreigners. Some of the banks were named as follows 
with the year of establishment
2: 
-  1845: Banque de Constantinople; it was the first Bank of  the Ottoman Empire 
-  1856: Bank-ı Osmani 
-  1859: İttihadi Mali 
-  1860: Türkiye Bankası  
                                                 
1 Galata derives an additional interest;  remember that the British banking evolved in Lombard  
Street! The history of banking has a sort of “street-brotherhood” sense to it. 
2 Akguc (1989) provides an in-depth analysis of banking in the Ottoman Empire.  11
-  1863: Bank-ı Osman-i Şahane; it was licensed as the Central Bank of the Ottoman 
Empire. It emerged from Bank-ı Osmani that was founded by a British and French 
joint venture. Later, a new approach in favour of national banks was brought in and 
in 1863 Ziraat Bank was established
3 with state capital.  
-  1868: İstanbul Emniyet Sandığı; it was followed the tradition but foreign banks 
created joint ventures with local capital as well.  
-  1869: Austria-Ottoman Bank 
-  1872: the Austria-Turkish Bank.  
Coincidently, in 1881 Duyun-u Umumiye was established as a declaration of the 
bankruptcy of the Ottoman Treasury and external control over public finances was 
introduced. It was the end of banking and finance in the Ottoman Empire even though 
Istanbul Bankası was not to be established until 1911. It may be worth underlining the 
fact that there was never a banking act in the Empire, but only some financial 
regulations such as Murabaha convention in 1887. 
In summary, banking licences were distributed in the Ottoman Empire just to 
secure easier and cheaper government borrowing. Even though incentives for national 
banks were used and some banking activity in Anatolian cities such as Konya and 
Aydın appeared, endless wars rose barriers to capital formation and financial services 
were never a priority. Unsustainable public spending, mostly military, led to crowding 
out and loss of land and human capital could not support financial development. The 
late Ottoman history failed to create a suitable economic environment for financial 
development because as both the land and human capital of the Empire decreased, so 
confidence in the future of the Empire fell. Local, national and international conflicts 
prevented potential growth from being realised. The political agenda gave priority to 
survival. It might be argued that the Independence War was financed with the Asia 
Minor Capital hidden from the central authority. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Ziraat Bank has managed to survive in the new Turkish Republic and still in 2008, it is one of the 
biggest commercial banks in Turkey. Its privatisation is planned in the following years.   12
4. Banking and Finance in Turkey 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire did not only mark the end of a multi-cultural 
state in the previous lands of the Eastern Roman Empire, but also it threw a huge 
burden on the new Turkish Republic that gained independence in the final stages of 
the Empire. With little in the way of inherited human capital and a very heavy external 
debt burden transferred from the Empire, the early years of the young Turkish State 
were characterised by a lack of potential for capital formation. And, of course, without 
capital, those early years were full of challenges to create additional resources to pay 
the inherited debt. It was not until the 1950s that the final instalment of the Ottoman 
debt was paid. 
 
4.1 The First Decade 
One of the most effective financial decisions was to bargain with the Central 
Bank of the Ottoman Empire to provide sound money for the young Republic. As 
money at those times was mostly backed by gold, at least to a certain extent, any 
additional financial stress was eliminated by allowing the central banking license to 
survive and create a capital base for the new State. It was a key decision that proved 
itself by preventing financial crises in the early years. Perhaps the potentially most 
difficult time for banking in Turkey was managed most successfully compared to later 
decades when crises and stress followed each other in almost every decade. 
Financial underdevelopment was one of the main characteristics of the late years 
in the Ottoman Empire. A lack of monetisation led to the dominance of a non-money 
base in trade and transactions, effectively implying the existence of a barter economy. 
Just after the declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic, hunger prevention 
and poverty reduction was inevitably prioritised. As an almost closed economy with 
agriculture dominant, no inheritance of physical or human capital from the Ottomans 
but rather only debt, the lack of a national central bank and with credit channelled 
mainly by foreign banks with strong capital bases and credit powers built up over a 
long period, there was no chance for private banks to emerge. The banking sphere was 
characterised at this time mostly by foreign banks with foreign capital and a couple of 
local banks with single branches. The priority of designing the democratic institutions  13
was not a barrier for the public sector to lead banking and finance because of a lack of 
private capital. Public money injection was inevitable if a financial system, a 
prerequisite for welfare enhancement, was to be created. 
Until the creation of a national central bank in 1930, there were around 22 small 
domestic and 13 large foreign banks with 419 branches.
4 In the first decade of the 
young Republic, the incentive to pursue a policy of nationalisation was high in the 
light of the strong negative reaction to foreign capital. Foreign banks, however, were 
not closed, as they were capable of providing cheaper and long-term finance from a 
strong capital base. There was no problem in understanding the importance of finance 
for growth and trade, and local banks were empowered for regional development. 
Learning banking in the early years of the Republic, escaping from financial crisis and 
even resisting the effects of the United State’s Great Depression of 1929 with almost 
perfect fiscal discipline allowed the emergence of a mixed private-public banking 
system that eased the burden of financial re-development and re-structuring. Between 
1923 and 1932, more than 20 local banks went bust mostly because of the Great 
Depression. 
In order to support national capital accumulation, Turkiye Is Bankası was 
licenced as a private bank capitalised with certain incentives in 1924. Additionally, the 
re-structuring of Ziraat Bank for agricultural support was completed. These two banks 
are still active and are leading banks in their areas. In order to support manufacturing, 
the Industrial Bank of Turkey (Sınai ve Maadin) was established in 1925. Another 
sectoral bank was created for construction in 1927 as Emlak ve Eytam Bankası. A 
National Central Bank came after ten years from the first meeting of the General 
Assembly. Between 1923 and 1932, more than five foreign banks opened branches as 
an indication of the liberal approach to international capital. In 1932, there were 
around 45 national banks in Turkey. 
 
4.2 The Second Decade: the Banking System Matures  
At the beginning of the second decade of the Young Republic, the basic 
financial architecture was almost complete with the creation of a central bank and the  14
emergence of private banks. Public banks were inserted to the financial system in 
order to further support capital formation. A public and private co-operation to 
empower the young Republic was considered to be the road to welfare growth. 
Additionally, sectoral banks were created in order to give incentives for prioritised 
areas of development. For example, Sumerbank was formed in 1933 to encourage the 
development of the textiles sector. Moreover, there was the Municipal Bank for 
regional development, Etibank for natural resources including iron and steel, 
Denizbank for sea lines and maritime development and Halk Bankası for small- and 
medium-sized enterprise credits. In the second decade, no short-term advance from the 
central bank was allowed and credits were given to support sustainable welfare gains 
without triggering inflation. 
Banking sector modernisation increased with the approval of the Deposit 
Insurance Law in 1933, followed by the Banking Law in 1936. However, the strong 
effects of the Great Depression caused a reduction in the number of operating banks 
and branches with chronic bankruptcies of the single branch domestic banks. Towards 
the end of the second decade, the young Republic lost its founder, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, at a time when the Second World War began in Europe. Expectations sunk to 
their lowest level because of both the internal and global turmoil and attempts to meet 
basic needs and increase defence expenditures took over from the priorities of banking 
and finance. In general, this period is viewed as exhibiting almost the lowest level of 
financial development with conservative credit expansion. The public sector supported 
industrial development but, until the end of the war, banking and finance lost its 
impetus. 
 
4.3 Damage Control and post-war Gains  
Although Turkey did not take a part in the Second World War, already scarce 
resources were directed to defence and, thus, banking and financial development was 
delayed during wartime. Public resources were used for basic needs and the private 
sector’s aim was to control the damage and limit the impact of the war in Europe on 
the Turkish economy. 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Akgüç  (1989).  15
Capital controls, interest rate controls and a fixed exchange rate regime were the 
main pillars of the economic policies pursued during the 1940s. Real interest rates 
stayed positive. A substantial devaluation of 113% in 1946 under the fixed exchange 
rate regime and a licence for foreign exchange fixing were announced with the 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
intention was to achieve a competitive foreign exchange rate before certain rules were 
imposed under Bretton Woods. 
Selective credits and credit expansion were heavily regulated through different 
means such as investment licences with publicly-sponsored credits. A lack of financial 
deepening led the deposit base and monetisation by the Central Bank of Turkey 
(TCMB) to be the main sources of credit. Prioritisation of investment banking was 
intended to help banks to merge but, with a young population with a high average 
propensity to consume, it was quite impossible to increase the saving ratio. 
During the second half of the 1940s, small banks with low capital bases 
disappeared fast. A newly emerging trend was the fast growing private banks which 
reached 30 in number. For example, in 1946 Yapı Kredi and Garanti, in 1948 Akbank, 
in 1953 Demirbank, in 1954 Sekerbank and Vakıfbank were formed. An explosion in 
branch numbers and increased non-price competition occurred because of interest rate 
controls. In 1958, the banks came together to establish Turkish Bankers Association.  
During the first half of the 1950s, there was a sharp change in economic policies 
for development: from nationalisation to privatisation and a liberal approach to 
development became the priority. This change jump-started growth after the global 
political turmoil during wartime. The welfare gains were lost quickly, however, in the 
second half of the decade when an erosion of fiscal discipline led to inflation and 
extreme central banking experiments such as the distribution of reserve requirements 
as credits to finance government deficits with short-term advances of up to 15% of the 
budget, became common practice. Additionally, the governments tried to create 
development by following a strategy of selecting priority sectors, printing money and 
giving it as credit. However, the ultimate effect was inflation and an explosion of 
central bank credits.  16
Thereafter, a banking crisis with devaluation came in 1958. More than 10 banks 
went bust and enforced mergers were conducted to delay solutions to public banking 
problems. Banking Law was also revised in this year. In 1960, the Banking Solvency 
Fund was put forward by the central bank in order to manage bad debts accumulated 
by the fall of liberal economic policies of the 1950s. 
 
4.4 Back to the Planned Economy: Can Banking and Finance be Planned as well?  
As the cold war heightened political stress all around the world, Turkey also 
experienced a period of uncertainty that led to the military coup in 1960. The new 
order put an end to liberal development strategies and imposed a heavily regulated 
import-substitution growth strategy. Import license deposits at the TCMB were a 
typical example of how strong the reaction was against imports. Financing State 
Economic Enterprises and creating a public company for almost all products including 
consumer goods such as milk brought governance to a joint system, which was neither 
fully liberal nor socialist. Banking became simply the practice of funding the “Five-
Year Plans”, of which the first was implemented between 1963 and 1967. Until 1983, 
more than 4 plans were designed, but not all were successful, as the implementation of 
even the best designed plans always had the problem of financing, which was 
continuously scarce. 
Heavy planning was framed within the five-year development plans. In the first 
half of the 1960s, the new economic order created sustainable development with high 
growth rates and low inflation levels. Selective central bank credits to planned 
investment projects with preferential rates and credit preference to the public sector, 
especially heavy agri-credits supported strong growth in the early years. With 
controlled interest and foreign exchange rates, branch banking became a norm without 
any pressure of competition and “holding banking”
5 dominated the decade encouraged 
by tax incentives. Industrial conglomerates had no choice but to try to have a bank in 
order to finance their potential investments as most of the deposit base of the financial 
system was strictly channelled to “planned” investments. Limitations surrounding new 
banking licences increased the value of operating banks but public banks such as the 
                                                 
5 The term refers to priorising irrationally a group (holding) company in credit allocation.  17
State Investment Bank and the State Tourism Bank had no difficulty in beginning their 
operations with the hope that all such banks would create strong sectoral development 
in their area. Surprisingly, the first foreign bank of the Republic was established in this 
decade when the American-Turkish Foreign Trade Bank was created. Foreigners were 
allowed to open foreign exchange accounts whereas the savings gap was filled by 
workers’ remittances. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, a lack of financial innovation, the conflict 
between liberalism and state planning, interest and foreign exchange rate controls 
characterised by heavy-handed planning and creative central banking increased 
pressure on sustainable growth. Creative solutions such as “convertible accounts”, 
which gave a right to create an indexed asset on hard currencies and nationalised 
foreign exchange risks added to the cost of payment system crises through contingent 
liabilities. The two oil crises wiped out almost all the gains of the planned 
development strategy based on import-substitution. Balance of payment crises and 
central bank competition for hard currency deposits including indexed or convertible 
bonds did not help to create a suitable environment for banking even though the 
Banking Law was more than four times revised and the number of banks decreased 
from 59 to 44. Financial crises and continual devaluation pressures on the currency 
increased the need for a re-structuring of finance and banking. 
 
4.5 Banking under Openness and Export Led Growth 
The 1970s were one of the worst decades for the economic prospects of Turkey. 
The global oil price shocks were mismanaged and adaptation to the new order was 
slow and inadequate without increased savings and accomplished structural reforms. 
There were queues for basic consumption goods on the streets and dollarisation 
increased sharply due to un-ending foreign exchange rate risks arising from a lack of 
hard currency reserves. “In need of 70 cents” became a popular saying to explain the 
difficulties of those times. At this difficult conjuncture and with the involvement of 
the IMF, there was a Paris Club agreement to re-structure external debts and a new 
economic policy package was announced in January 1980; at that time there were 44 
banks in Turkey.  18
The basic aim of the new economic package for banking and finance was to lift 
the heavily-regulated banking practices and jump-start a competitive and open 
banking system based on the quality of financial services. In July 1980, the setting of 
interest rates was left to the market as liberalisation intensified. The exchange rate 
regime was moved towards a flexible managed float instead of a fixed rate regime and 
foreign exchange rates were announced daily from May 1981 in order to put an end to 
the periodically unexpected devaluations. 
During the early 1980s, the TCMB was determining deposit rates but interest 
rates on loans were set freely even though high and volatile inflation rates eroded the 
capital adequacy ratios of banks. Financial liberalisation opened the doors for 
competitors and bankers armed with certificate of deposits began to challenge the 
dominance of banks in the financial system. However, a lack of adequate supervision 
and regulation coupled with ponzi style games created a systemic risk and there was a 
Bankers’ crisis and a loss of confidence in 1983. Learning how to compete was not 
risk free and banks such as Istanbul Bank, Ortadogu Iktisat Bank, Hisarbank and 
Workers Credit Bank that relied on those bankers all went bust. Bagbank followed 
them in 1984. The lesson from the bank failures was that without proper regulation 
and supervision to support a strong capital base, financial consolidation and incentives 
for capital inflows can lead to catastrophic results opposed to financial deepening. 
Consequently, the Banking Law was revised once again in 1985 in order to rectify the 
deficiencies that led to the 1983 crisis. 
The second half of the 1980s witnessed another critical decision for banking and 
finance in Turkey: the TCMB was licensed to conduct open market operations. It was 
a critical decision because, most of the time, the interest and the exchange rate were 
set by dictate and credit allocation committees were involved in certain central 
banking decisions. It was far from central bank independence but still an important 
step towards the market economy that allowed a base for marketisation to be defined. 
Not only were the required decisions for the emergence of money markets were taken, 
but also the Capital Markets Board (in 1982) and the Istanbul Stock Exchange (in 
1986) were formed as well. The TCMB designed the money market infrastructure and 
a strategic borrowing mechanism for Treasury bonds and bills was developed, which 
was followed by interbank money markets, foreign exchange and banknote markets  19
and even a gold market to put an end to unregistered gold imports and unofficial gold 
trade. In 1986, the framework of monetary policy might best be described as implicit 
monetary targeting, which was a turning point for the TCMB. 
The main pillars of the 1980s were the end of import substitution, the emergence 
of export-led growth, financial liberalisation, marketisation, the support of 
entrepreneurship and private ownership along with incentives for privatisation. 
However, good-will and an encouraging road-map were not enough for prosperity 
with sustainable growth and low inflation. In the second half of the 1980s, economic 
and financial stability was again lost, and Tobank in 1987 and Caybank and Anadolu 
Bank in 1988 went bust. Advances to the Treasury of 15% of the annual budget, 
almost daily devaluations and foreign exchange deposits allowed not only for workers 
abroad but also for local residents, increased the speed of dollarisation. The Turkish 
lira was struggling to compete against hard international currencies such as the US 
dollar and the Deutsche Mark. 
 
4.6 The 1990s Banking and Financial Crisis 
The marketisation incentives of the 1980s generated a serious gap for high 
quality financial regulation and supervision. Transition from heavy state involvement 
in relative price adjustment to market-determined pricing resulted in financial 
discipline being deficient. Capital account liberalization in 1990 further obscured the 
picture and led to an accrual of open foreign exchange positions in the financial 
system just as soon as Turkey became a small open economy. Postponing the 
elimination of worker’s deposits at the TCMB, securitisation and incentives for 
external borrowing complicated the management of risks. A whole series of factors 
added to the Treasury’s borrowing requirements: managing financial liberalisation 
whilst ignoring current account deficits; signing a customs union agreement with the 
EU without convergence aids; absence of structural reforms; misuse of public banks; a 
lack of fiscal discipline; increasing political tensions with periodically early elections; 
failed privatisations, a lack of social security reforms in a system which gave the 
chance for early retirement at 38; and investment in public infrastructure.  20
Although the banking sector was opened to external competition, a high level of 
financial volatility kept the participation ratio of foreigners in the banking system 
below 10%. The IMF became involved in many stand-by agreements, most left 
incomplete. Rating Agencies came onto the scene with an external evaluation of the 
national economic situation. Interestingly, the first rating level given still remains the 
highest ever. Extremely high real interest rates of more than 20% resulted from 
chronic mismanagement of inflation expectations and increased hot money pressures. 
Worse than that, strictly controlled bank licensing lost its strength and easy licenses 
were given with simple transfers of bank ownership. 
At this time, the TCMB was fighting for financial stability. New instruments for 
monetary policy implementation were introduced, including open market operations, 
liquidity controls and discount window. Compulsory hard currency transfers from 
banks supported a flexible exchange rate regime. The domestic borrowing scheme 
created transparency for debt management. An increasing need for external borrowing 
and a growing level of reserves caused an active reserve management strategy with 
forced interventions in the foreign exchange markets. Explicit monetary targeting in 
1990 proved quite successful in terms of achieving the targets, but failed to control 
inflation and thus gain credibility. In the first half of the 1990s, the banking system 
desperately needed a nominal anchor around which inflation expectations could form. 
The lack of a credible stabilisation programme and the mismanagement of the 
public debt as well as interventions in TCMB operations with implicit and explicit 
tools during 1993 caused financial stress to cumulate and in 1994 a destructive 
banking crisis returned once again. At this time there were 67 banks operating in 
Turkey. Again, many, such as TYT Bank, Impexbank, Netbank, and Marbank, failed.
6 
Financial deepening and development once again paused with real interest rates at 
levels of more than 50%. Coincidently, money and capital markets gained importance 
and special emphasis has been laid on “markets” ever since. This may not be 
surprising under the circumstances since although the debt to national income ratio did 
not indicate a risk, the duration of the debt was less than six months. There was a huge 
burden on rolling over the debt which occurred at the expense of financial system 
                                                 
6 The easing of the licensing rules in 1987 may take some of the blame for the high cost of the 
banking crisis of 1994.  21
stability. A new economic stabilisation programme was announced with the support of 
the IMF in April 1994. The TCMB Law was also changed and there was a road map to 
diminish the rate of advances to the Treasury from 15% to 3% after 1998. One critical 
mistake was to give a 100 per cent blanket guarantee for deposit holders in May 1994. 
The 1990s might also be marked as another “lost decade” for the country’s 
banking and financial development prospects. Even though there were many national 
policy mistakes, global financial conditions were not favourable either. The invasion 
of Kuwait and the first Iraq War, global turmoil associated with the Tekila, south-east 
Asian and Russian crises and the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
hindered the ability of domestic policies to break out of the vicious circle of financial 
stress. Even nature pitched in with the 1998 earthquake, which caused a negative 
growth rate. Banking was trying hard to survive and most of the structural reforms that 
would give a boost to ease the burden of these difficult times were delayed because of 
a lack of political commitment. Even if it became clear that there was no easy way out, 
applications such as extra budgets just to take more advances from the TCMB and 
Workers’ Super foreign exchange accounts with import incentives to collect more 
deposits at the TCMB were not helping to increase credibility. 
Day-to-day management of the economy came to an end in 1999 when an 
exchange rate based stabilisation programme with the IMF involvement was 
announced. Actually, it was an almost perfectly designed programme that anchored 
inflation expectations and decreased borrowing costs for the Treasury for a while. 
Unfortunately, it failed because of incomplete promises, especially in the areas of 
privatisation and public sector re-structuring. 
1999 witnessed rapid credit growth for the first rime in Turkish banking history. 
There was a full commitment to price stability and a pre-announced exchange rate 
horizon was kept for six quarters with an exit strategy. However, various components 
of the programme were broken with a lack of full commitment to privatisation (of, for 
example, Turk Telecom). Non-ending delays on the promised structural reforms 
sharply increased foreign exchange risk and with the first accumulated stress signal in 
November 2000, a couple of banks went bust. An additional package from the IMF 
was not enough to prevent a terribly destructive financial crisis in February 2001 with  22
a sudden collapse of the 1999 programme. Bank runs caused by the systemic risk and 
inevitable devaluation cost more than 4% of GNP, due to a 100 per cent blanket 
guarantee. More than 10 banks went bankrupt, overnight interest rates rose to above 
15000% (which may be a European history record) and the debt to income ratio more 
than doubled to a level beyond that enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. The collapse of 
the programme resulted from inadequate IMF funding, the lack of a contingency 
funding facility and a short-run vision with respect to debt sustainability. 
Implementation failures such as delays in banking re-capitalisation and privatisation of 
public banks and the endless discussions on the ownership of the programme only 
caused deeper wounds. 
There are many reasons why banking and finance development have failed to 
outperform countries in transition that began their liberalisation at least ten years later 
then Turkey
7: 
1.  Central bank independence was never prioritised or well-respected. Advances to 
the Treasury had been misused in almost all cases where the annual budget got 
into difficulties with the “extra budgets” structured to siphon more advances from 
the TCMB. 
2.  Funds were siphoned regularly by the Treasury from public banks in order to hide 
unbearable levels of borrowing requirements and irregular redistributions of 
wealth. The privatisation of these banks was delayed for almost two decades. 
3.  High and volatile borrowing requirements crowded out both the households and 
the corporate sector and significantly reduced the potential for financial deepening. 
Treasury bonds and bills had invaded banks’ balance sheets. Consequently, banks 
dominated the financial system and blocked the emergence of insurance and other 
financial services. 
4.  Because of crowding out, creative credit channelling became common practice. In 
particular, back-to-back credits or holding banking, referring to selecting group 
companies - even when there were more rational and profitable investment 
opportunities from unconnected firms - were common practice from the 1970s 
onwards.  23
5.  Irreversible mistakes in the area of regulation and supervision increased the cost of 
risk management. Even creating an umbrella institution such as the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (the Turkish FSA), it had taken very 
complicated discussions and extensive delays occurred. Capital market supervision 
is still under a different institution, i.e. the Capital Markets Board. Deficiencies in 
capital adequacy have been accumulated through frequent changes to the banking 
law, in almost every decade. There were also unexcused delays in enhancing the 
institutional framework and missed opportunities to put in place a rational set of 
tool kits for risk control. Practices such as blanket guarantees for all deposits and a 
lack of a proper solvency law for banks have not helped to create better prospects 
for banking sector development. 
6.  Institutional quality failed to catch up European standards. Good governance has 
never been a priority. 
7.  A lack of appetite for reform has been accompanied by failed attempts to create an 
economic environment for sustainable growth and price stability. Macroeconomic 
problems covered up most of the deficiencies and inefficiencies in the national 
economy, hiding the microeconomic problems as well. Short-sightened policies 
became common practice with chronic political instabilities followed by un-ending 
cycles of early elections. There was almost no chance for a fully-committed 
medium or long-term stability programme to be implemented. 
8.  Misjudgements occurred over the choice of foreign exchange regime, especially 
after the two oil crisis. Because of inadequate savings, there was a continual 
requirement for balance of payment financing. Managed float hid foreign 
exchange risk and, most of the time, private losses resulting from foreign exchange 
risk were nationalised. Even the TCMB balance sheet carried an open position 
annually because of the foreign exchange deposits of workers abroad. 
9.  Mismanagement of the liberalisation of capital flows in 1989 by not ensuring a 
priori a proper regulation and supervision framework and going into the customs 
union with Europe in 1996 without receiving the counterpart aid packages, 
resulted in the build-up of a large degree of fragility.  
                                                                                                                                            
7 For an extended analysis see, Saraç (2002).  24
Lessons from the 1990s financial crisis could be endless. However, the question 
of risk measurement and management, the institutional framework and good 
governance as well as the coordination of economic policies are among the most 
important. Fiscal dominance increased the cost of recovery and the IMF was called in 
once again. The significance of supervision and regulation was, this time, understood 
but at a high cost. Taxpayer’s money had to be injected to re-capitalize the banking 
sector. The 2001 financial crisis can be characterised as the end of an era with all the 
ensuing uncertainties and ever accumulating risks. 
 
4.7 Banking in the 21
st Century: the Road to the European Union 
The last crisis terminated the country’s long lasting experience with some form 
of managed exchange rates and free floating became inevitable. Foreign exchange risk 
was at last left to the markets, putting in place incentives for responsible investment 
decisions that would prevent excessive risk taking. The new economic programme 
aimed at prudent fiscal and monetary policies along with structural reforms including 
the foundations of an economy that would be well-placed on the track of sustained 
low-inflationary growth. The ultimate goal would be to make the economy more 
resilient to adverse shocks, less vulnerable to crises, more equitable in income 
distribution, more conducive to foreign and domestic investment, and as a 
consequence, to be better positioned to integrate into European structures.
8 
The agenda of the new order was full of reforms, including the jump-starting of 
privatisation. Credible actions were taken to approve laws for real transformation and 
the transition to a free market economy. The extensive re-capitalization of banks as 
well as re-structuring of state-owned banks were both parts of the new programme. 
Fiscal management reform, public resource management and enhancing the role of 
private sector had been given priority as well. A decision was taken to expel state 
involvement from production and manufacturing and to open the field for the private 
sector. The goal of price stability had been legally underlined with a change in the 
TCMB Law
9 forbidding advances to the Treasury and the buying of Treasury debt 
                                                 
8 Monetary Policy Framework announcement in September 2002. 
9 Price stability as the overriding objective; the central bank and the government jointly 
determine the inflation target and  instrumental independence was legalized.  25
instruments on the primary market. Raising credibility with single digit inflation 
targets in the medium term and strong growth to enjoy a window of opportunity 
provided by favourable demographics, were the main pillars of the programme. 
Banking based on sound risk management with transparency, credibility and 
accountability had been a prerequisite for successful implementation of the 
programme. 
The new road map for the economic stabilisation programme placed heavy 
burdens on banking and finance in the early stages. Almost all the banks lost 
confidence in each other and preferred to deal with the TCMB directly, a phenomenon 
recently observed in the US as well. After more than 15 failures, a new commitment to 
complete an IMF agreement fully opened the way to ease the burden of crowding out 
on banks’ capital bases. Primary surplus targets to end fiscal dominance had also 
helped. 
Banking in the 21
st century began with a terrible crisis but subsequently was 
given an opportunity to concentrate on microeconomic problems. The increasing 
pressure of competition and the need to develop an extensive set of risk controls 
became welcome problems for banks following the macroeconomic problems of the 
past decades. Managing EU convergence, sustaining profitability under heightened 
global volatility, managing foreign exchange risk carefully when private sector was 
heavily indebted in foreign currencies under a floating exchange rate regime, 
expanding at least locally in order to compete globally were among the challenges for 
banks. 
When early signs of the success of the stabilisation programme began to emerge, 
foreign investors started to search for potential bank acquisitions in Turkey. With an 
improved capital base and offering good opportunities (and in particular good 
demographics) compared to other transition economies, the Turkish financial markets 
attracted increasing attention from Greek, British, German, French and American 
banks. Increasing mergers and acquisitions caused the foreign participation rate to rise 
above 30% within a couple of years. The lack of financial deepening implies that 
Turkey offers a huge potential for growth in the following decades. Looking back at a 
later date it might be the case that the first decade of the 21
st century will be seen as  26
the end of national banking in Turkey, particularly if state-owned banks are also sold 
to foreign investors. 
In the first half of the first decade of the 21
st century, the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the TCMB was formed to help institutionalise the monetary policy 
framework and, indeed, implicit inflation targeting proved successful, bringing 
inflation down to single digits. Given the full commitment to price stability under 
floating rates with the TCMB instrument independence, the Monetary Policy 
Committee began to target inflation explicitly with strong transparency, credibility, 
and accountability. As a result, inflation was brought down to less than 8% in 2005. 
There is a full awareness that even such a historically low level of inflation is not 
equivalent to price stability as defined, for example, by EU institutions. Consequently, 
the medium and long term inflation target is to bring inflation to 4% and keep it at that 
level until EU convergence is achieved. 
Banking experienced further rapid credit growth and the customer base of banks 
was enlarged. Financial deepening has now occurred and fiscal dominance has been 
overturned with high primary surpluses being achieved. Increased competition and the 
impact of globalisation under the floating exchange rate regime exposed banks to 
currency risk. The TCMB managed capital inflows during convergence with regular 
foreign exchange buying auctions and rare interventions to buy domestic currency. 
Recent challenges for banks in Turkey have included adapting to a low inflation 
environment after all the years of high and volatile inflation, developing new financial 
instruments to meet the hedging demands of their customers and investing in new 
generation technologies, especially in payment systems, so as to sustain a strong 
customer base. 
 
4.8 Lessons Learned 
88 years of learning how to bank since the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
was opened in Ankara have inevitably brought many important lessons. The price of 
learning was high with the crises of 1958, 1979, 1983, 1994 and 2001 and global 
shocks such the 1929 depression, competitive devaluations in Europe, World War II, 
Bretton Woods, the Cold War, Marshall Aid, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the oil  27
price shocks of the 1970s, global inflations through to the end of the 1970s, the 1980s 
Latin American Debt crises, Glasnost and Perestroika, transition in Eastern Europe, 
the South-East Asian, Tekila and Russian financial crises, the German unification and 
the ERM crises, the birth of the euro and, lately, the energy and food price shocks. 
Surprisingly, banking related crises were concentrated in the recent past, as opposed to 
priors that might have led to expectations of crises during the early years since initial 
conditions were more prone to stress and there were many understandable deficiencies 
and fragilities. This might lead to the conclusion that there was no structural problem 
with the institutional design of the early Turkish banking framework but mistakes 
were made often as finance matured.  
The first lesson is a very common truth that banking is unique in its ability to 
generate risks of contagion. When one bank is in trouble, other banks may get into 
difficulties with potentially large output losses being a consequence. This side of 
banking puts pressure on the authorities to promote safe and sound supervision and 
regulation. One may argue that the institutional framework of banking in Turkey after 
1940 permanently required further improvements especially during the various shifts 
in orders - the Second World War, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the first and second 
oil crises, liberalisation and marketisation in the 1980s, the elimination of capital 
controls and the opening up of competition in 1990 and finally, the promotion of EU 
convergence. The fact that the Banking Law changed at least twice in each decade 
might be an indicator of the incomplete nature of rules, law and order in domestic 
banking and finance. The recent reforms to the institutional framework might be 
judged successful and globally competitive if the steady rise in foreign participation 
ratio over the five years is an indication. 
When dealing with banking and finance, special emphasis should be placed on 
its systemic nature since losses can easily affect public finances. Recent turmoil in the 
US and the UK has once again reminded us of the fact that financial sector losses are 
usually nationalised because of their impact on economic activity as a whole. If the 
credits channel fails, low growth and high inflation usually follows. Turkey 
nationalised bank losses many times with the blanket guarantee granted in 1994, being 
the most extreme example, which had a huge cost in 2001.  28
The second lesson from the history of Turkish banking includes the importance 
of a well-balanced balance sheet. Excessive risk taking may grant high returns from 
time to time, but on average it leads to a loss of capital because of fire sales. At the 
same time, off-balance sheet activities should stay under control not to threaten 
unbearable losses through loss of confidence arising from transparency hesitations. 
Calculating and managing risk extremely carefully and being aware of fiscal and 
global imbalances are vital if a profitable balance sheet is to be sustained. Ignoring the 
basics of banking services may cause profits to be foregone during financial deepening 
periods but may save large losses during credit crunches. It may be ironic to observe 
that the same logic holds not only for Turkish banks but also for the US, British and 
Swiss banks as well, as their sub-prime mortgage losses have already reached 
hundreds of billions of US dollars. 
The third lesson is to keep capital adequacy as strong as possible. Stakeholders 
should remember that strong capital bases allow banks to absorb losses and that, 
unless there is a systemic risk, the monetary authorities will not come to save the bank 
and the financial service provider during the difficult times. 
The fourth lesson is to stay away from actions that may lead to systemic risks. 
One may assume that under such cases, rescue will be inevitable. However, 
shareholders are usually forced into bankruptcy and the bank is saved only 
institutionally with new owners and sometimes under a different brand name.  
The fifth lesson is not to rely on unlimited deposit guarantee schemes. This 
lesson has parallels with the fourth because it is with unlimited deposit guarantee 
schemes; it is the deposit holder that is saved following financial collapses, not the 
shareholders. 
The sixth lesson is to allow the market room to mould the banking system and to 
avoid excessive regulation and supervision. In the long run, the prices are best set 
according to the market power of supply and demand. Once intervention becomes 
draconian, it may not be sustainable in the long run with excessive social costs of 
trying to defend the strict rules. A floating exchange rate regime may contribute 
significantly in this area, as it internalises the foreign exchange risks and enhances the 
appetite for risk management.  29
The seventh lesson is to invest in advanced technologies, especially in the 
payment and custody systems as basics of banking and finance. Comparative 
advantages in these areas create a sustainable non-interest income base through 
commissions and increases resilience during turbulent times. 
The final lesson which emerged only recently is to increase awareness of global 
opportunities rather than concentrating solely on the domestic market. It becomes 
quite challenging to survive as a bank with only a local focus, because of the 
prevalence of global hunters. Unless synergies are exploited through mergers and 
acquisitions, survival as an independent financial service provider seems quite 
unsustainable in the long run, especially once eventual membership of the European 
Union becomes a goal. 
It is not surprising to observe that these lessons have many common 
characteristics with global banking and finance experiences. As the nature of this 
sector is essentially the same globally, one lesson in a particular country often holds 
for many others. In the next section, the current stance of Turkish banking will be 
analysed to see whether all these lessons have been learnt or not. 
 
5. Banking and Finance in Turkey: Recent Developments  
According to data from the Banks’ Association of Turkey (BAT)
10, recently 
there are 50 banks operating in the country. Four of them are participation banks. 
Table 1 compares the figures of the last two years. 
 
Table 1: Banks in Turkey 
  March 2007  March 2008  March 2008 
 Bank  Branch  Bank  Branch  Employee 
Deposit Banks  33  6928  33  7801  157938 
   State-owned  3  2150  3  2246  41393 
   Private  12  3636  11  3759  77648 
   Deposit Fund Bank  1  1  1  1  288 
   Foreign  17  1141  18  1795  38609 
Investment and Development  13  46  13  51  5357 
Total 46  6974  46  7852  163295 
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Recovering from the crisis of 2001, the banking sector increased its contribution 
to growth. As Figure 1 suggests, the number of branches and employees has been 
increasing. 























Most of the banking data goes back to the 1960s and Table 2 displays the 
historical data from the balance sheet for the sector as a whole provided by the BAT. 
 
Table 2: Banking Sector Balance Sheet (USD million) 
ASSETS         1960        1970              1980        1990         2000  
Liquid Assets           502       1.274            5.812     19.094   49.825 
Loans        1.088       3.267          10.011     27.342   50.919 
Permanent Assets           276          576               896       4.626   22.920 
Other Assets           287          966            1.913       7.109   31.283 
Total Assets        2.153       6.083          18.631     58.171   154.947 
LIABILITIES                
Deposits           874       2.564             9.132     32.564   101.884 
TL               -              1                   14     24.864   54.953 
FX               -               -                     -       7.700   46.931 
Non-Deposit Funds              53           695             1.155     11.760   29.435 
Other Liabilities           899       2.292             7.316       7.944   12.909 
Shareholders' Equity           295           502                762       4.535   7.514 
Total Income             32             30                266       1.368   3.205 
Total Liabilities        2.153       6.083          18.631     58.171   154.947 
                                                                                                                                            
10 The publication is available on the web: http://www.tbb.org.tr/english/40.htm, and covers most of 
the BAT data that will be used in this section.  31
Table 2 records the dollarisation trend of the last two decades clearly and exhibits the 
relatively low levels of credit to deposit ratios. In Table 3, the BAT data summarises 
historical indicators of the banking sector. 
 
Table 3: Comparative Macroeconomic Variables 
     1960 1970 1980  1990  2000
Wholesale Price Index  1968=100  73 117 2,063  71,234  13,361,552
USD/TL Exchange Rate     9 15 89  2,927  671,765
GNP TL  Billion  47 208 5,303  393,060  125,970,544
M2 TL  Billion  10 44 882  71,570  31,912,095
M2Y  TL Billion           87,482  56,849,061
RATIOS (%) 
Total Assets          
Total Assets/GNP    41.5 43.5 31.4  43.3  82.6
Total Assets/M2    192.9 203.9 188.6  237.9  326.2
Total Assets/M2Y          194.6  183.1
Deposits          
Deposits/GNP   16.9 18.3 15.4  24.3  54.3
Deposits/M2   78.3 86.0 92.4  133.2  214.5
Deposits/M2Y         109.0  120.4
Loans          
Loans/GNP   21.0 23.3 16.8  20.4  27.2
Loans/M2   97.5 109.5 101.3  111.8  107.2
Loans/M2Y         91.5  60.2
Capital Adequacy          
(Shareholders' Equity + Total Income) / T. Assets  15,2 8.7 5.5  10.1  6.9
(S.ers' Equity + T. Income)/(Deposits+Non-d. Funds)  35.3 16.3 10.0  13.3  8.2
Net Working Capital / T. Assets    2.4 -0.7 0.7 2.2  -1.7
Asset Quality          
Total Loans / Total Assets    50.5 53.7 53.7 47.0  32.9
Permanent Assets / Total Assets    12.8 9.5 4.8 8.0  14.8
FX Assets / FX Liabilities    - -  -  88.1  75.9
Liquidity          
Liquid Assets / Total Assets    23.3 20.9 31.2 32.8  32.2
Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-deposit Funds)  54.2 39.1 56.5  43.1  37.9
Profitability          
Net Income / Average Total Assets    1.7 0.2 1.7 2.8  -3.6
Net Income / Average Total Shareholders' Equity  12.8 2.4 40.2  36.0  -89.8
Net Income / Average Share Capital    15.9 2.8 40.1 62.3  -71.9
Income - Expenditure Structure          
Net Interest Income / Average Total Assets  2.5 2.5 5.4  6.4  3.5
Interest Income / Interest Expenses    190.5 183.7 181.8 135.5  127.7
Non-interest Income / Non-interest Expenses  86.4 48.2 55.8  57.7  19.8
Total Income / Total Expenses    120.0 102.7 111.1 112.2  95.8 32
The impact of chronic fiscal dominance is clear in the above table as the loan to GNP 
ratio increased from 21% to only 27% in 40 years. Another problem for the Turkish 
financial system is the dominance of banks: Table 4 (from the second Financial 
Stability Report of 2007 (FSR, 2007)) shows that almost 87% of the financial sector is 
dominated by banks. These are two faces of the same coin. On one hand, the figure 
indicates the underdeveloped nature of financial services. On the other hand, it 
underlines the potential financial deepening gap for the following years, especially in 
the context of European convergence. 
 
Table 4: Banks Dominate the Turkish Financial System 
 
The FSR (2007)
11 also provides a set of analytical data to make comparisons between 
the Turkish financial system and the European countries (see Table 5). 
                                                 
11 For a detailed analysis, please refer to: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/evds/yayin/finist/finist5.php 
(Billion TRL) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 June07
Assets/GDP
(%,June07)
Banks 216,7       255,0       313,8       406,9       499,5         533,7         87,2               
Leasing Companies 3,8           5,0           6,7           6,1           10,0           11,4           1,9                 
Factoring Companies 2,1           2,9           4,1           5,3           6,3             6,6             1,1                 
Consumer Fin. Companies 0,5           0,8           1,5           2,5           3,4             3,4             0,6                 
Insurence Companies 5,4           7,6           9,8           14,4         17,4           18,5           3,0                 
Pension Companies -          3,3           4,2           5,7           7,2             7,2             1,2                 
Securities Stock Broker(2) 1,0           1,3           1,0           2,6           2,7             3,4             0,6                 
Securities Investment Partn. 0,1           0,2           0,3           0,5           0,5             0,5             0,1                 
Securities Investment Funds 9,3           19,9         24,4         29,4         22,0           24,6           4,0                 
Real Estate Investment Partn. 1,1           1,2           1,4           2,2           2,5             2,7             0,4                 
Total 314,1 370,4 437,7 560 668,6 713,9 116,6
Central Bank 74,1     76,5     74,7     90,1     104,4     109,2     17,8           33
 
Table 5: Total Assets of Credit Institutions* 
(billion Euros)  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany     6,370    6,393    6,584    6,826     7,123 
France     3,831    3,998    4,419    5,073     5,728 
U.Kingdom     5,855    6,171    6,931    8,318     9,651 
Greece        202       213       230       281        315 
Czech Republic          79         78         87       101        115 
Hungary          44         55         68         78          94 
Bulgaria           8          9         13         17          22 
Romania          13         15         23         35          51 
Turkey        131       155       192       248        305 
*Banks, Leasing Companies, Factoring Companies and Consumer Financial 
Companies are included in CIs.    
With its population of almost 72 million, mostly under 30, the potential for 
growth in the financial sector in Turkey is substantial and most probably this is the 
main motive for increased foreign participation in the sector. The impact of long-
lasting fiscal dominance limited the credit expansion to the private sector and Turkey 
may well be the only European country with a net un-indebted household sector. Table 
6, taken from the FSR, compares consumer credit stocks in different countries. 
Table 6: Consumer Credit 
(billion Euros)  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany 225.2 174.9 174.4 171.0  167.6 
France 121.1 128.4 134.1 142.0  148.7 
United Kingdom  259.6 256.5 281.0 307.1  315.3 
Greece 9.8 12.4 17.0 20.8  25.5 
Czech Republic  1.4 1.7 2.2 3.1  4.0 
Hungary 1.2 2.1 3.0 4.8  6.9 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 1.5 2.2  2.5 
Romania n.a. n.a. 2.1 4.4  9.2 
Turkey* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  24.8 
*Data are available after June 2005 due to changes in the calculation of consumer 
credits. 
The picture is quite similar regarding the corporate sector (see  Table 7).  34
 
Table 7: Loans  to non-financial Corporations* 
(billion Euros)  2002 2003  2004  2005  2006 
Germany 841  814  787  774  800 
France 549  535  567  611  670 
United Kingdom  440  408  427  540  631 
Greece 52  58  63  69  74 
Czech Republic  14  14  15  19  24 
Hungary 15  18  21  23  26 
Bulgaria n.a.  n.a.  5  6  7 
Romania n.a.  n.a.  7  10  15 
Turkey 9  13  20  33  38 
*Corporate sector intermediation     
With all these indicators suggesting future potential, there appears not to be a   
structural concentration problem for the Turkish banking sector and indeed indicators 
from the FSR (2007) show that the situation is quite similar to many European 
countries, as seen in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Market Share of the 5 Largest Credit Institutions 
(% of total assets)  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany      21      22      22      22       22 
France      45      47      49      52       52 
United Kingdom      30      33      35      36       36 
Greece      67      67      65      66       66 
Czech Republic      66       66      64      66       64 
Hungary      55      52      53      53       54 
Bulgaria  n.a.  n.a.      52      51       50 
Romania  n.a.      55      60      59       60 
Turkey      57      59      58      61       61 
The above analysis probably underestimates the structural problems of Turkish 
banking by focusing only on the potential. It may be better to underline the fact that 
short-termism is one of the most difficult challanges the sector faces for the future. 
The average maturity of the deposit base is less than three months. While many 
European countries have a government bond yield curves for nearly 30 years, Figure 2 
shows a current yield curve calculated by the TCMB. The longest end of the yield  35
curve is only four years and worse than that between 2 to 4 years, there are a limited 
number of bonds and bills; most of the maturities lie between 6 months to two years.  
Figure 2 
 
Dollarisation is another structural macro problem for the Turkish financial 
system. Because of the history of persistent high and volatile inflation and unexpected 
currecy’s devalutions, there is a strong inertia with dollarisation even if there has been 
some limited success to de-dolarise certain assets. Figure 3 exhibits the recent phase of 
dollarisation. As seen in Figure 4, the outlook for the future of dollarisation depends 
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After the 2001 crises, strong primary surpluses have helped to ease the burden of 
fiscal dominance. As the Treasury decreased the supply of bonds and bills, household 
and corporate sector credits expanded rapidly. Most of the discusions have surrounded 
the financial account of the balance of payment. Another way of looking at a current 
account deficit problem is to increase the savings ratio in order to close the gap 
between savings and investment, which is equalised by external inflows. In inceasing 
the savings ratio, banking and finance could play a critical role and with the help of 
single digit inflation levels, Turkish banking and finance seems now ready for the 
future challanges. European convergence can only help the way forward and increase 
the awareness of the importance of monetary and financial stability as two 
prerequisities for the future potential of banking and finance in Turkey. 
 




































































































6. Conclusion and Recommendations  
The final years of the Ottoman Empire take much of the blame for the 
destruction of all capital formation channels in Asia Minor. When the collapse came to 
a close in 1920 with the formation of an independent Assembly in Ankara, all that was 
inherited was a huge debt burden with no hope for the emergence of a strong financial 
system. Struggling with poor initial conditions, a scarcity of basic consumption goods 
and a production structure dominated by agriculture delayed the formation of private 
banks. Even capital controls were inevitable under the heavy burden of the Ottoman 
Debt instalments that lasted until the 1950s. 
Looking back to this time, however, one might argue that it was the most 
successful period of Turkish banking and finance. While initial conditions were poor 
and the institutional framework was limited, perceptions of finance and good 
governance were at their highest. A lack of capital accumulation and human capital 
created quite difficult times in the early years and global conflicts coupled with 1929 
US depression only increased the cost of survival for the emerging capital base. The 
reaction was to inject public money to create at least semi-private banks. However, 
heightened conflicts in Europe and the beginning of the Second World War delayed 


























































































was to prevent financial crises through heavy regulation at a time when even bread 
distribution had to be licensed. Public money was used to support the financial system 
extensively until the Marshall Aid Programme. 
From the 1950s, a jump-start for capital accumulation within the framework of a 
market economy went into force and private banks were established. Without the U-
turn in the 1960s in favour of a “plan based”, centralised development strategy based 
on import substitution, there might have been no demand for “creative” central bank 
financing for the country’s economic development and thus inflation was the ultimate 
result. 
The semi-socialist approach to economic governance might be considered for 
the mismanagement of the twin oil crises of the 1970s. After the collapse of Bretton 
Woods, the Turkish economy failed to adapt to the new order. As a result, a lack of 
structural reforms, ever-increasing dollarisation inertia and a lack of fiscal discipline 
coupled with central bank financing of public deficits through short-term advances 
created an unfriendly environment for banking. Additionally, a lack of adequate 
supervision and regulation gave rise to Ponzi games and a Bankers’ crisis took away 
already scarce capital base of private banks. 
The management of change requires strong attention to be given to a well-
designed institutional framework. It was the early 1980s when Turkey started to 
implement an export-led growth strategy, supported by liberal economic governance 
to break-up boom and bust cycles. The central bank and the public banks were 
gradually removed, to a certain extent, from direct competition with private banks. 
The aim was to remove intervention and heavily-regulated public sector involvement 
in the production and distribution channels and encourage private entrepreneurs to be 
the leading innovators so as to encourage future productivity that would further 
increase wealth accumulation. This was before Glasnost and Perestroika, when strong 
incentives for privatisation were also evident. Unfortunately, in the following decades, 
countries in transition managed to implement similar re-structuring policies much 
more successfully than Turkey. Consequently, 1990s can be considered “lost years” 
for banking and finance in Turkey. Many mistakes were made, including the opening 
up of the capital account without having in place a strong supervisory and regulatory  39
framework and joining to the European customs union without a financial support 
package. The outcome was chronic financial stress, the 1994 crisis and accumulated 
pressures on structural reforms that were never given enough attention. 
On the eve of the 21
st century, the Turkish financial markets and banking system 
paid a huge price for all these problems and the 2001 crisis wiped out more than 4% of 
national income. At that time, a challenging reform agenda including both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic policies was put in place and, because of the cost 
of past financial turmoil, there was social consensus backing reforms. Central bank 
independence was one of the most important reforms to limit the monetisation of 
public deficits. Banking re-structuring and re-capitalisation have been implemented 
successfully and a new road map for eventual European Union membership has been 
reflected in a decrease in the risk premium, a phenomenon also supported by a rare 
successful IMF stand-by programme. 
The fruits of the success came sooner rather than later and Turkish banking and 
finance has attracted increasing interest from the global financial service providers 
through mergers and acquisitions. The heightened interest of global financial 
conglomerates in Turkish banks has taken the share of foreign participation to above 
30% and the capital adequacy ratio to above 15%. Recently, the foreign participation 
rate has been increasing further and, as state-owned banks are being privatised as 
planned, the ratio is expected to increase to over 50%. Since 1920, there have been 
quite difficult times. However, with the current window of opportunity with 
favourable demographics arising from the young population structure, Turkish 
banking and finance seem ready for the future challenges of managing current account 
deficit financing, reversing the impact of dollarisation, breaking out of the trap of 
concentration on the domestic market under the increasing pressures of globalisation 
and bringing Turkey into the European Union.  40
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